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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses multiple discriminant analysis to test for similarity in 
patterns of industrial development in the Middle East. The study divides the 
Arab world into three groups: oil economies, middle-income countries and 
low-income countries. It was found that factors such as absorption/gross 
domestic product, imports/absorption, domestic linkages and size have been 
instrumental in moulding the industrial structures of the region. 
Introduction 
Classification schemes have been used numerous times 
to produce generalizations capable of expanding our 
knowledge of events in ways not possible through 
simple examination of individual entities. The most 
useful taxonomies in the Arab world originate from the 
work of Yusif Sayigh1• 
Sayigh's work has focused mostly on the underly-
ing determinants of economic and social development 
in the region. In doing so, he was able to show a 
number of factors common to groups of Middle East-
ern countries, and in the process greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms leading 
to development in that part of the world. 
More recently, and focused on a much narrower 
topic, researchers have attempted to identify through 
various country groupings patterns of industrial devei-
opment. 2 The presumption is that each country group-
ing delineates an environment unique to the set of 
member countries. Furthermore, it is assumed that this 
environment affects on industrial development in a 
predictable manner to produce a characteristic indus-
trial structure over time. 
The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of 
industrialization in the Middle East from the perspec-
U\'e o{ common en-.ironmental conditioning. z\re 
there similar patterns of industrial development in the 
Middle East, and if so what are they? 
What factors have been responsible for these con-
figurations and are they likely to continue in the 
future? 
Classification Schemes 
As one might imagine, most attempts at classification 
begin with oil or its lack and draw implications for the 
conversion of oil revenues into investment in the 
industrial sector. For example El-Imam (1986) has 
developed a four country grouping focused on the 
extent of oil resources: 
1. All countries presently members of OPEC. The oil 
resources of these countries will continue, for sev-
eral years, to exceed their own needs. These coun-
tries may be further divided into two sub-groups. 
a Algeria and Iraq, which have a large hydrocarbon 
sector, but at the same time possess other natural 
resources, as well as sizeable human resources. 
b Those countries whose major resources is oil but 
which lack other natural resources. Most of its 
members also suffer from scarcity of manpower. 
They include Libya and the four Gulf states of 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). 
\ Sec {Ol ~'{usif Sayigh (\978). 
2 Sec for example Rohen E. Looney and Craig Knouse (1987) 
and Roben E. Looney (1987). 
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2. Countries with greater balance between oil re-
sources and needs, which are expected to run out of 
oil resources in the near future. They include Oman, 
and the other members of the Arab group within 
OPEC (OAPEC), Bahrain, Egypt, Syria and Tuni-
sia. 
3. Countries which may have limited oil resources but 
are essentially importers of oil and its products. 
a A middle income group comprising Jordan, Leba-
non and Morocco. 
b Less developed countries including Djibouti, 
Somalia, Sudan and the two Yemens. 
Implicit in this typology of countries is the pre-
sumption that the development pattern and in particu-
lar the structure of industry will be conditioned by de-
velopments in the oil sector. The linkage from oil to 
industry was made more explicit in 1980 in the Joint 
Arab Economic Report· Arab Monetary Fund (1980), 
which divided the Arab countries into four groups. 
The first group comprised the Arab OPEC mem-
bers, distinguishing between those which are rela-
tively densely populated and considered to have a 
diversified economic base and a large absorptive 
capacity for investment (Algeria and Iraq) and the 
others (Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE). 
The third group contained the remaining countries 
ofBahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, 
Syria and Tunisia; these were officially defined as 
developing and sometimes divided between the five 
that were self sufficient in oil and the three that were 
not. 
In terms of the link between oil and industrial 
structure, the Joint Arab Economic Report made a 
convincing argument for four major country group-
ings (as of the early 1980s): 
1. The first comprised those countries possessing a di-
versified manufacturing sector - Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. 
2. Bahrain, kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were 
grouped together as countries with large-scale pre-
dominantly oil and gas industries. 
3. Sudan, Libya and the People's Democratic Repub-
lic of Yemen made up the third group of coun-
tries whose industrial structure fell somewhere 
between the first two groupings' criteria. 
4. The remaining countries were classified as display-
ing industrial sectors of limited diversity and size. 
The problems of disparity within the GCC, espe-
cially with relation to the size of the Saudi economy vis 
a vis the others was recognized by the Joint Report, but 
it went on to argue that the individual GCC economies 
have all grown relative to other Arab economies since 
the early 1970s. Furthermore, those states starting 
with a very small industrial sector (Qatar, the UAE, 
and particularly Oman) experienced the greatest ex-
pansions in manufacturing output. In other words 
common forces in the GCC appear to be pulling 
towards a convergence of industrial structures. 
The grouping of Libya with Algeria and Iraq brings 
together the three largest Arab economies after Saudi 
Arabia, and while Libya's absorptive capacity is ar-
guably smaller than the other two countries, it has 
actively and successfully been pursuing a broadly 
similar industrial strategy-socialist-inspired, funded 
by oil revenues and leaning towards heavy industry. 3 
The third group of six middle income countries 
seems particularly fitting, with these states occupying 
the top six places in the Arab world in terms of the 
share of manufacturing in the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct. 
There is no great homogeneity in the manufactur-
ing structure, performance or prospects of the fourth 
group of low income Arab countries, but they all strive 
against a general lack of financial resources which in 
a period characterised by high capital formation has 
been responsible for the widening of the gap between 
these and the other Arab economies. 
A certain consistency is also found within the 
differing output structures displayed by the manufac-
turing sectors of countries in these groupings. The 
GCC states, for instance, all emphasize chemical 
products and building materials while tending to ig-
nore more labour-intensive industries in the agro-
industry and clothing sectors. 
The middle income states' manufacturing structure 
is much more evenly spread across the various manu-
facturing divisions. 
In sum, the country groupings examined above 
provide valuable insights into both contrasting pat-
terns of industrial development in the Arab World, and 
the processes through which these structures were 
created. In large part, however, these groupings are 
anecdotal and subjective-based principally on a "feel" 
for the region, rather than on quantitative analysis. The 
purpose of the following section is to see if and to what 
extent the industrial patters alluded to above, can be 
confirmed through statistical methods. 
3 See Arab Banking Corporation (1986) 
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Methodology 
The principal method of analysis was discriminant 
analysis. The data set used for the analysis consisted 
principally of the national income accounts of the 
twenty members4 of the Arab Monetary fund. s The 
variables selected for analysis represented different 
facets of manufacturing activity: 
a manufacturing value added/absorption . 
b manufacturing value added/value added in services 
(housing, government services, other services). 
c manufacturing value added/value added in dis-
tributional activities (commerce-restaurants-hotels, 
transportation-communication-storage 
and finance-insurance-banking). 
d. manufacturing/non-oil GDP 
e. manufacturing/commodities (agriculture, utilities, 
and construction). 
As noted above, the analytical approach capable of 
identifying whether unique country groupings can be 
formed on the basis<"'.. the five measures of manufac-
turing activity is multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA).6 Numerous applications ofMDA to identifi-
cation problems based on profile data have been made. 
In past research, MDA has been used primarily as a 
method of studying profile relationships among sev-
eral groups and for classifying individual entities into 
groups.7 
This paper, however, makes use of a specific aspect 
of MD A which is frequently ignored: that is, its ability 
to provide the best statistical basis (in a least squares 
sense) for computing estimates of the specific proba-
bilities of a Arab country placed on the basis of its 
industrial structure in a pre-specified country group-
ing. As a starting point, and based largely on the 
studies surveyed above, the twenty Arab countries 
were classified into one of three groups: 
1. Oil Economies: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, 
Kuwait, and Libya. 
2. Middle Income Countries: Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon. 
3. Low Income Countries: PDR Yemen, Yem~n 
Arab Republic, Sudan, Somalia, and Mauritania. 
The results of the discriminant analysis programme 
produced on the basis of industrial structure a proba-
bility of placement in each of the three groups. 
As a second step, a step wise discriminant analysis 
was used to determine the statistical significance (the 
contribution of the variable to differentiating coun-
tries) as given by the F Statistic of each of the five 
measures of industrial activity. 
Results 
The discriminant analysis exercises produced (Tables 
1-3) a number of interesting patterns: 
1. At the beginning of the period ( 197 5) there does not 
appear to be a strong delineation of industrial struc-
tures among the Arab countries (Table 1). This is 
evidenced by the relatively low probabilities of 
correct placement for Group I, II and III countries 
(68.41, 39.00 and 66.50 respectively). 
2. As a corollary, none of the measures of industrial 
structure were statistically significant (based on 
values for the F statistic). 
3. The best results were obtained for the oil producers 
with no misclassifications, followed by low income 
group. 
By 1980 (see Table 2): 
1. Delineation improved to the point that only two 
countries were misclassified: Saudi Arabia, and 
Tunisia. 
2. In addition, several of the measures of manufactur-
ing activity, manufacturing/services and manufac-
turing/non-oil GDP, were now statistically signifi-
cant in classifying countries into their respective 
groupings. 
3. An examination of the means of the discriminating 
variables indicates that several major similarities 
exist between Groups I and III: (a) both groups 
have relatively low ratios of manufacturing to serv-
ices, distribution, and absorption. In large part this 
reflects the underdevelopment of manufacturing in 
Group III countries and overdevelopment of serv-
ice and distribution in Group I countries. 
By 1985 (see Table 3): 
1. The Delineation between the three country group-
ings was much clearer, with oil countries possess-
ing an average probability of correct placement of 
92.67. 
2. The only misclassified country was Iraq (classified 
as oil country). 
3. Three measures of manufacturing activity were 
statistically significant: manufacturing/non-oil 
GDP, manufacturing/services and manufacturing/ 
distribution. 
4. As in 1980, Groups I and III have relatively low 
4 Because of missing values for some variables Syria, Lebanon, 
Iraq were often not included in the fmal results Mauritania was 
also missing in several of the final results 
5 See Arab Monetary Fund (1987) 
6 The progranune used for the analysis below was from the Statis-
tical Analysis System. See Sas User's Guide (1985). 
7 See for example Klett (1972) and Jones (1980), pp. 74-80. 
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Table 1 
Arab Countries: Profiles of Industrial Structure, 1975 
Probability of Correct Placement 
Five Variables 
Country Group I Group II Group III 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE 48.24 
Bahrain 51.27 













Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen 32.11 




Discriminating Variables F Statistic 
Manufacturing/absorption 0.61 8.98 
Manufacturing/services 0.70 46.48 
Manufacturing/distribution 0.67 42.43 
Manufacturing/non-oil GDP 0.90 12.70 
Manufacturing/non-oil comm. 1.19 33.36 
ratios of manufacturing to services, distribution 
and non/oil GDP. 
5. Using only the three statistically significant vari-
ables, in general it is apparent that three groups of 
Arab countries have, in recent years, had signifi-
cantly different patterns of industrial development. 
Furthermore, these patterns become more apparent 
over time, as each group of countries grows along a 
somewhat different path of development. 
Put differently, it appears that with the 1973/74 oil 
price shock, Arab countries possessed varied indus-
trial structures, each of which had evolved in its own 
rather unique setting. While broad groupings of coun-


















































apparent at this time, differences between individual 
countries were great enough to blur these broad dis-
tinctions, making them of somewhat limited use in our 
understanding of the process of Arab industrialization. 
The question at this point is whether this differen-
tiation process can be explained as the result of envi-
ronmental factors. Were the macro-economic envi-
ronments of our three groups of countries significantly 
different, and if so, how did they impact on industrial 
development? Put differently can we profile these 
environments with the same degree of precision ob-
tained for industrial development, and if so what are 
the links between economic environment and the overall 
pattern of industrial develooment? 
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Table 2 
Arab Countries: Profiles of Industrial Structure, 1980 
Probability of Correct Placement 
Country Group I 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE 61.76 
Bahrain 73.93 














Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen 10.61 




Discriminating Variables F Statistic 
Manufacturing/absorption 0.02 7.96 
Manutacturing/services 3.15 42.76 
Manufacturing/distribution 2.63 32.37 
Manufacturing/non-oil GDP 3.43 11.34 
Manufacturing/non-oil commodities 0.86 33.03 
In his study of industrialization Al-Moajil(1986, p. 
9-30) grouped all the Arab Gulf states - Bahrain, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates-together and argued that they repre-
sented a homogeneous environment. The above anal y-
sis, and in particular the results presented in Table 3, 
indicate that there is considerable justification for this 
• grouping. 
Al-Moajil notes that from the mid-1970s onwards, 
an economic cycle developed in which oil revenues 
allowed ever increasing government spending on 
current account as well as on development projects. 
Government spending fuelled increased economic 
activity, which in turn attracted or demanded more 






















































tion workers to top level management executives and 
engineers. The influx of labour created more demand 
for houses, hospitals and schools and so more oil reve-
nues were required to fund more infrastructural devel-
opment. 
According to Al-Moajil, two perspectives are im-
portant in understanding the Gulf States industrializa-
tion efforts: 
1. Despite efforts in each of these states to diversify 
sources of income though industrialization, the 
constant increase in the value of oil exports up to 
1982 meant a continuation of the dominance of the 
oil sector while the impact of the small but impor-
tant contribution of the infant industrial sector was 
diminished to the point of being ignored. 
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Table 3 
Arab Countries: Profiles of Industrial Structure, 1985 
Probability of Correct Placement 
Five Variables Three Variables 
Country Group I Group II Group III Group I Group II Group ill 
Oil Economies--Group I 
UAE 91.64 8.36 0.01 86.96 13.02 0.02 
Bahrain 99.93 0.o7 0.00 99.72 0.28 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 62.40 36.54 1.06 80.51 18.84 0.65 
Oman 99.87 0.o7 0.05 99.54 0.12 0.34 
Qatar 99.89 0.11 0.00 99.12 0.87 O.Ql 
Kuwait 99.11 0.87 0.02 99.84 0.16 0.00 
Libya 95.85 2.78 1.37 88.31 4.70 7.00 
Average 92.67 6.97 0.36 93.43 5.43 1.15 
Middle Income-Group II 
Iraq 69.60 29.61 0.79 73.79 24.67 1.55 
Jordan 14.67 70.58 14.75 38.62 56.64 4.74 
Egypt 0.22 93.76 6.03 0.41 95.43 4.17 
Algeria 0.00 53.73 46.23 0.01 71.02 28.97 
Tunisia 0.24 82.70 0.24 0.30 87.76 11.95 
Morocco 0.39 99.45 0.16 0.15 99.57 0.27 
Average 14.19 71.64 11.37 16.18 62.16 7.38 
Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen 0.25 43.23 56.52 4.56 72.66 22.78 
Yemen AR 0.49 10.58 88.93 0.34 5.99 93.68 
Sudan 0.00 1.75 98.25 0.00 0.96 97.86 
Somalia 0.00 1.35 98.64 0.00 1.41 98.54 
Average 0.19 14.23 85.59 1.23 20.26 78.22 
Group Means 
Discriminating Variables F Statistic I II III 
Manufacturing/absorption 0.65 8.49 11.01 6.15 
Manufacturing/services 5.27 37.22 66.55 58.34 
Manufacturing/distribution 4.99 34.84 48.82 31.00 
Manufacturing/non-oil GDP 6.81 11.68 14.16 8.42 
Manufacturing/non-oil commodities 0.18 37.70 34.72 19.90 
2. The increase in population and per capita income 1. Size Variables: Has the size of the local market 
together with changing patterns of consumption led constrained industrial development in the Arab 
to rapid development of local markets. The private world, and in particular in the Arab Gulf states? To 
sector played a fundamental role in the efforts to testthishypothesistherelativeshare(ofArabworld 
benefit from new market situations by establishing total) of each country's population and GDP were 
small scale manufacturing units to produce com- included in the analysis. 
modities for the local consumer. These private 2. Government Expenditures: Has the expansion of 
sector efforts depended heavily on state support in • governmentalspendingaided(throughdemandcrea-
the form of subsides and incentives of various tion) or hurt (through the preemption of scarce re-
kinds, as well as the provision by the state of fully sources) the region's industrial efforts? Two types 
equipped and serviced industrial sites for which all of public good expenditures, civilian and military, 
development costs were borne by the state. were included to test for this factor. 
Al-Moajil's comments are suggestive of several 3. Domestic Linkages: Has diversification into manu-
sets of variables that might have created the individual facturing been stimulated by domestic demand stem-
environments in which Arab industrialization has taken ming from the growth of complementary sectors, or 
place in recent years: has demand been directed more towards imports? 
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Table 4 
Arab Countries: Industrial Environments, 1975 
Probability of Correct Placement 
Seven Variables 
Country Group I Group II 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE 100.00 0.00 
Bahrain 100.00 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 100.00 0.00 
Oman 100.00 0.00 
Qatar 100.00 0.00 
Kuwait na na 
Libya 99.94 0.06 
Average 99.00 0.01 
Middle Income-Group II 
Jordan 0.00 31.84 
Egypt 0.00 98.89 
Algeria 0.00 98.32 
Tunisia 0.00 23.01 
Morocco 0.00 74.74 
Average 0.00 65.36 
Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen na na 
Yemen AR 0.00 1.02 
Sudan 0.00 31.89 
Somalia 0.00 1.38 
Mauritania 0.00 18.00 
Average 0.00 13.o7 
.Discriminating Variables F Statistic 
Relative share of Arab world population 2.16 
Relative share of Arab world GDP 0.86 
Government civilian expenditure/absorption 0.20 
Gov'emment military expenditure/absorption 0.13 
Absorption/GDP 15.32 
Imports/absorption 4.47 
Non-oil GDP/absorption 6.96 
Three measures of the composition of demand were 
tested: (a) non-oil GDP/absorption, (b) imports/ 
absorption, and (c) absorption/gross domestic prod-
uct. 
As with the exercises above, the discriminant analy-
sis was undertaken on two levels. In the first instance: 
all six variables were used and the probabilities of cor-
rect placement recorded. In the second case, only the 
three variables of highest statistical significance were 
included in the analysis. The second set of runs, 
therefore, pinpoint the variables that were of crucial 
importance in placing countries in their respective 
groupings. 
Again, several interesting patterns (Tables 4-6) 
emerged: 
Three Variables 
Group III Group I Group II Group III 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
na 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 99.98 0.02 0.00 
0.00 99.99 0.01 0.00 
68.16 0.00 41.40 58.60 
1.11 0.00 44.04 55.96 
1.68 0.00 84.84 15.16 
76.99 0.00 63.74 36.26 
25.26 0.00 56.28 43.72 
34.64 0.00 58.06 33.20 
na 0.00 25.54 74.46 
98.98 0.00 28.83 71.17 
68.11 0.00 34.49 65.51 
98.62 0.00 36.41 63.59. 
82.00 0.00 72.22 22.78 
86.93 0.00 39.SO 59.SO' 
Group Means 
I II III 
1.35 11.32 3.88 
7.50 5.54 0.09 
0.57 0.23 0.19 
0.17 0.10 0~04 
0.63 1.20 1.29 
0.66 0.39 0.35 
0.66 0.75 0.75 
1. At the beginning (Table 4) of the period under con-
sideration (1975), Group I countries were classi-
fied with nearly a 100 per cent chance of correct 
placement. 
2. The variables most relevant for this grouping were: 
(a) absorption/GDP, (b) non-oil GDP/Absorption, 
and (c) imports absorption. 
3. Because of their large trade surpluses this group of 
countries had a significant! y lower ratio of absorp-
tion to GDP, While at the same time their ratio of 
imports to absorption was somewhat higher than 
that experienced by the other two groups. Finally, 
the dominance of oil in these economies manifests 
itself in the relatively low ration of non-oil GDP to 
absorption. 
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Table 5 
Arab Countries: Industrial Environments, 1980 
Probability of Correct Placement 
Seven Variables 
Country Group I Group II 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE 100.00 0.00 
Bahrain 100.00 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 99.84 0.16 
Oman 99.98 0.02 
Qatar 99.61 0.39 
Kuwait 100.00 0.00 
Libya 99.96 0.04 
Average 99.91 0.09 
Middle Income-Group II 
Iraq 15.57 84.37 
Jordan 0.00 35.41 
Egypt 0.00 99.53 
Algeria 0.19 97.12 
Tunisia 0.02 65.37 
Morocco 0.00 59.25 
Syria na na 
Lebanon na na 
Average 2.63 73.Sl 
Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen na na 
Yemen AR 0.00 1.02 
Sudan 0.00 31.89 
Somalia 0.00 1.38 
Mauritania 0.00 18.00 
Average 0.00 13.07 
Discriminating Variables F Statistic 
Relative share of Arab world population 2.77 
Relative share of Arab world GDP 0.36 
Government civilian expenditure/absorption 0.62 
Government military expenditure/absorption 0.22 
Absorption/GO DP 15.00 
Imports/absorption 4.60 
Non-oil GDP/absorption 1.24 
4. Interestingly enough, market size did not appear to 
be a critical factor in affecting industrial diversifi-
cation at this time-the relative share of Arab world 
population is only marginally significant in contrib-
uting to the separation of country groupings. 
5. As might be expected the Group I countries had 
relatively large ratios of government expenditures 
to absorption. However, this factor does not facili-
tate understanding of the industrial structures in the 
Middle East at this time. 
By 1980 (See Table 5): 
I. The delineation between groups was essentially the 
same as in the base vear. However. the middle 
Three Variables 
Group III Group I Group II Group III 
0.00 99.94 0.06 0.00 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 93.66 6.31 O.Q3 
0.00 95.58 4.35 0.o7 
0.00 99.99 O.Ql 0.00 
0.00 99.97 O.Q3 0.00 
0.00 96.49 3.47 0.04 
0.00 97.95 1.18 0.02 
0.06 75.36· 24.49 0.15 
64.59 0.02 36.57 63.41 
0.47 0.00 98.12 1.87 
2.70 0.14 90.60 9.27 
34.61 1.78 82.03 16.19 
40.75 0.00 72.16 27.84 
na 0.02 48.48 51.51 
na 0.18 54.10 45.72 
23.86 9.69 63.32 27.00 
na 0.00 1.24 98.76 
98.91 0.00 4.64 95.36 
68.11 0.00 65.80 34.20 
98.62 0,01 24.77 75.23 
82.00 0.04 35.91 64.05 
86.93 0.01 33.09 73.52 
Group Means 
I II III 
1.42 10.53 3.62 
7.93 6.15 0.08 
0.41 0.36 0.18 
0.14 0.11 0.05 
0.63 1.06 1.31 
0.63 0.43 0.34 
0.65 0.73 0.75 
income group was somewhat more sharply defined. 
2. A size variable-the relative share of Arab world 
population had replaced the domestic linkage term 
as third ·most important variable in differentiating 
the three country groupings. 
Finally, by 1985 (See Table 6): 
I. Delineation between the three groups was still quite 
sharp, with only one country, Mauritania, misclas-
sified on the analysis based on three variables. 
2. The differentiation between Groups II and III was 
not nearly as sharp as that between I and the other 
two, nor had it improved significantly over that 
obtained in the base period. 
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Table 6 
Arab Countries: Industrial Environments, 1985 
Probability of correct placement 
Seven Variables 
Country Group I Group II 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE 100.00 0.00 
Bahrain 99.75 0.25 
Saudi Arabia 99.99 0.01 
Oman 100.00 0.00 
Qatar 100.00 0.00 
Kuwait 100.00 0.00 
Libya na na 
Average 99.96 0.04 
Middle Income-Group II 
Iraq na na 
Jordan 0.00 25.69 
Egypt 0.00 99.78 
Algeria 0.32 99.42 
Tunisia 0.02 99.67 
Morocco 0.00 98.03 
Average 0.07 84.52 
Low Income-Group III 
Yemen AR 0.00 0.03 
Sudan 0.00 1.39 
Somalia na na 
Mauritania 0.01 50.03* 
Average 0.05 16.42 
'Discriminating Variables F Statistic 
Relative share of Arab world population 1:08 
Relative share of Arab world GDP 1.17 
Government civilian expenditure/absorption 2.29 
Government Military expenditure/absorption 0.33 
Absorption/GDP 5.66 0.87 
Irnpor~/absorption 3.59 
Non-oil GDP/absorption 5.39 
3. Domestic linkages had increased in importance and 
were a close second in aiding in the classification 
process. 
4. While still not a major factor in the differentiating 
process, government expenditures (civilian) were 
increasing in statistical importance. 
Since the country groupings obtained using th~ 
macro-economic variables (Tables 4-6) were, for all 
practical purposes, the same as those obtained using 
only variables depicting industrial structure (Tables 1-
3), it is tempting to conclude that factors such as ab-
sorption/gross domestic product, imports/absorption, 
domestic linkages and perhaps size have been instru-
mental in shaping the industrial structures of the re-
Three Variables 
Group III Group I Group II Group III 
0.00 99.95 0.05 0.00 
0.00 95.17 4.81 O.D2 
0.00 90.39 9.52 0.10 
0.00 99.96 0.04 0.00 
0.00 98.49 1.51 0.00 
0.00 99.97 0.03 0.00 
na 86.03 13.89 0.09 
0.00 95.71 4.26 0.03 
na 4.36 86.09 9.54 
74.31 * 0.13 52.42 47.45 
0.22 0.41 79.77 19.82 
0.26 2.59 89.84 7.58 
0.31 0.66 83.30 16.04 
1.97 0.05 65.35 34.60 
15.41 1.37 76.13 22.51 
99.97 0.00 15.37 84.63 
98.61 0.00 30.27 69.73 
na 0.00 25.92 74.08 
49.96 6.41 81.22* 12.36 
83.53 1.60 38.22 60.20 
Group Means 
I II III 
1.46 10.88 5.34 
6.67 6.36 0.09 
0.38 0.34 0.17 
0.21 O.o? 0.05 
1.13 1.26 
0.47 0.36 0.38 
0.71 0.79 0.77 
gion. 
For the Gulf states this would suggest that their rela-
tively low levels of expenditures relative to GDP, their 
high rate of imports and rather low linkages between ' 
domestic production (non-oil GDP) and expenditures 
(absorption) have produced their observed pattern of 
industrialization characterized by a relatively low level 
of manufacturing relative to services, distribution and 
non-oil output; i.e., the general over production of 
non-tradeable and the under production of tradeahle 
goods. 
Before we conclude that this is in fact the case, it is 
important to note that other factors such as the so-
called "Dutch Disease", have also been identified as 
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biasing the industrialization process in the Gulf states 
towards non-tradeables. 8 Since, Dutch Disease effects 
are usually associated with sudden expansions in 
government expenditures, they should have been 
captured by the government expenditure terms (Tables 
4-6). The increased statistical importance of govern· 
ment civilian expenditures in the classification proc-
ess may indicate that Dutch Disease effects are finally 
beginning to retard industrial development in the Gulf 
states. 
Perhaps more importantly, the aggregate analysis 
carried out above may conceal important differences 
within groups, thus making any country specific pol-
icy conclusions quite tenuous. To overcome this 
limitation a final set of exercises were undertaken to 
delineate as much as possible the relative impact of 
domestic linkage and relative size on the region's in-
dustrialization process. 
To overcome this limitation, a factor analysis9 was 
used to determine the relative importance of domestic 
linkages and market size in affecting the industrial di-
versification efforts of the individual Arab countries. 
In terms of methodology, the following steps were 
included: 
1. Variables were selected to depict the impact of size, 
domestic linkages and the government involve-
ment in the economy. 
2. The size variables were the same as those used in the 
discriminant analysis - the relative share of Arab 
world population and income. Domestic linkages 
to industry were depicted by the ratio of non-oil gdp 
to absorption. The government's impact on manu-
facturing was represented by the ratio of govern-
ment expenditures to non-oil gdp and absorption. 
3. Several variables depicting the oil sector were also 
added to determine the relative impact of hydrocar-
bons on economic structure. 
4. To put the evolution of the manufacturing sector in 
perspective, variables depicting the distribution and 
service sectors were added. Each sector was de-
picted by two variables, the value added in the 
sector to absorption and to non-oil gdp. 
5. The impact of market size and domestic linkages 
were determined by comparing factor scores com-
puted with these variables in the analysis, and the 
factor scores obtained when these variables were 
omitted from the analysis. Put differently, factor 
scores represent the relative ranking of countries on 
each of the main dimensions (or environments) in 
the data set. 
6. Factor scores obtained by including size and do-
mestic linkages in analysis represent the relative 
ranking of countries in industrial development, 
given an environment in which size and domestic 
linkages were interacting with manufacturing out-
put to determine that sector's importance in the 
economy. 
7. Factor scores obtained by omitting either size, do-
mestic linkages or both, depict what the ranking of 
countries in the attainment of industrial diversifica-
tion in an environment where these elements were 
not impacting on the development of manufactur-
ing. The differences in factor scores between envi-
ronments where size and linkages are in the analysis 
and those obtained without these variables, provide 
an indication of the relative importance of these 
phenomena in shaping each country's industrial 
structure. 
The results (Tables 7-9), give some indication of the 
diversity at work across our three groups, and, perhaps 
more importantly, within each individual group: 
1. The factor analysis (Table 7) for the beginning of 
the period (1975) produced four main trends in the 
data: (a) an external dimension represented by oil 
and oil financed government expenditures, (b) an 
industrial factor consisting of manufacturing, serv-
ices/absorption and domestic linkages, (c) a distri-
bution dimension, and (d) a service sector dimen-
sion. 
2. In general, manufacturing at this point in time had 
developed somewhat independently of external 
factors. Instead, its development was controlled 
more by domestic linkages and to a lesser extent the 
relative size of the country in terms of population. 
3. In contrast, both distribution and service activities 
showed an inverse relationship to size. While 
domestic linkages were not important to the devel-
opment of distribution activities, they appear to 
have a negative association with services i.e., the 
greater the ratio of non-oil gdp to absorption, the 
smaller the contribution made by service activities 
to the overall economy. 
4. In terms of factor scores (fourth column bottom of 
Table 7), Bahrain had the greatest attainment of 
industrial diversification at the beginning of the 
period (in an environment where linkages and size 
8. See for example, Looney (1988), Al-Sabah (1988, p. 129-144) 
and Parvin and Hashem Dezhbakhsh (1988, p. 469-477) .. 
9. See Rwnmel (1970) for a general description of factor analysis 
together with an excellent description of how to interpret results. 
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Table 7 
Arab States: Factors Affecting Industrial Production, 1975 
Standard Regression Coefficients 
Oblique Factor Pattern 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4 
EXTERNAL MANUFACTURE DISTRIBUT. SERVICES 
Oil/absorption 0.97 - 0.05 0.13 - 0.01 
Oil/GDP 0.94 - 0.21 0.05 0.04 
Govt. expenditure/absorption 0.78 0.09 0.06 0.15 
Govt. expenditure/GDP 0.73 - 0.14 -0.04 0.30 
SIZE, INCOME 0.73 0.19 0.59 -0.07 
Absorption/GDP -0.91 - 0.11 -0.09 0.17 
Manufacturing/absorption -0.04 0.96 -0.01 0.11 
Manufacturing/GDP 0.00 0.93 -0.09 0.17 
Services/absorption 0.00 0.76 0.10 0.63 
LINKAGES -0.08 0.68 0.08 - 0.48 
Distribution/GDP 0.10 - 0.10 0.83 0.05 
Distribution/absorption 0.10 0.45 0.80 - 0.24 
SIZE, POPULATION 0.00 0.37 -0.52 - 0.39 
Services/GDP 0.05 0.23 -0.02 0.95 
Factor Scores (manufacturing) 
Incorporating 
Size, Pop. Linkages Size, Pop. Neither 
Linkages 
Oil Economles--Group I 
UAE -0.97(-) - 1.06(-) - 1.00(-) - 0.73· 
Bahrain 2.29(-) 2.46(-) 2.10(-) 2.52 
Saudi Arabia 0.64(-) 0.77(-) 1.07(=) 1.08 
·Oman - 1.78(-} -1.78(-) -1.55(+) - 1.71 
Qatar 0.41(+) 0.38(+) - 0.16(=) 0.22 
Libya 0.77(-) - 0.67(=) - 0.56(=) - 0.62 
Mipdle Income-Group II 
Jordan -0.17(=) -0.19(=) - 0.14(=) -0.19 
Egypt 1.09(+) 0.75(=) 1.36(+) 0.80 
Algeria -0.01(-) -0.11(-) 0.31(+) 0.20 
Tunisia 0.35(+) 0.41(=) 0.11(-) 0.21 
Morocco 1.20(+) 1.16(=) 1.24(+) 1.12 
Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen - 0.48(=) - 0.45(=) - 0.47(=) - 0.45 
Yemen AR - 0.66(=) - 0.67(=) - 0.78(-) - 0.67 
Sudan 0.20(+) 0.07(+) 0.02(=) - o.oi 
Somalia - 0.69(=) - 0.56(+) - 0.93(-) - 0.72 
Mauritania - 0.65(-) -0.49(+) - 0.63(=) - 0.58 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to column four factor scores. 
were not controlled for i.e., were not included in the tion of industrial output with the demand of other 
factor analysis and hence did not affect the relative sectors for manufactured goods were constrainingi 
factor scores), while Oman was the least diversi- industrial diversification of these economies. ~ 
fied. reverse appears to be the case for Qatar. . I 
5. Netting out size, and examining the effects of 6. In contrast, omitting linkages from the analy~ 
domestic linkages on industrialization efforts, the (third column, bottom Table 7), and incorporatillf 
considerably lower factor scores (column two rela- only the effect of size on industrial diversificatiol 
tive to column four, bottom Table 7) for the UAE produced significantly lower factor scores for tJJ 
and Saudi Arabia indicate that the lack of integra- UAE Bahrain and toa lesser extent Oman In othd ~--------~~~--;_;,_.-'-~~~~~~--~---"__:_-.......~~~-·~~~·~ . j 
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Table 8 
Arab States: Factors Affecting Industrial Production, 1980 
Standard Regression Coefficients 
Oblique Factor Pattern 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
EXTERNAL MANUFACTURE SERVICES DISTRIBUT. 
Govt. exenditure/GDP 0.92 - 0.10 - 0.10 - 0.01 
SIZE, INCOME 0.91 0.23 - 0.15 - 0.35 
Govt. exenditure/absorption 0.89 0.23 -0.06 0.06 
Oil/GDP 0.66 - 0.21 0.33 0.24 
oil/absorption 0.59 -0.12 0.40 0.28 
Absorption/GDP - 0.61 - 0.14 - 0.28 -0.34 
Manufacturing/absorption - 0.06 0.94 0.10 0.11 
absorption/ gdp 0.15 0.92 0.08 0.04 
LINKAGES - 0.49 0.61 - 0.03 0.12 
Services/GDP 0.16 - 0.09 - 0.96 - 0.22 
Services/absorption - 0.10 0.45 0.91 - 0.12 
SIZE,POPULATION 0.29 0.52 - 0.69 -0.06 
Distribution/GDP 0.14 -0.05 - 0.15 0.97 
Distribution/absorption - 0.16 0.41 -0.12 0.92 
Factor Scores (manufacturing) 
Incorporating 
Size, Pop. Linkages Size, Pop. Neither 
Linkages 
Oil Economies-Group I 
UAE - 0.63(-) - 0.48(=) - 0.62(-) -0.44 
Bahrain 1.75(-) 2.06(=) 1.69(-) 2.02 
Saudi Arabia 0.09(-) 0.11(-) 0.31(=) 0.36 
Oman - 1.83(=) - 1.93(=) - 1.78(=) - 1.89 
Qatar 0.10(+) - 0.11(+) - 0.16(+) - 0.45 
Kuwait 0.34(=) 0.29(-) 0.45(=) 0.38 
Libya - 1.10(=) - 1.23(-) - 1.00( +) - 1.14 
Middle Income-Group II 
Iraq - 0.33(-) - 0.37(-) - 0.23(=) -0.24 
Jordan - 0.12(-) 0.11(-) 0.03(-) 0.30 
Egypt 1.26(+) 0.86(=) 1.30(+) 0.86 
Algeria 0.58(=) 0.56(-) 0.69(=) 0.68 
Tunisia 0.64(=) 0.76(+) 0.55(=) 0.66 
Morocco 1.75(+) 1.61(=) 1.76(+) 1.59 
Low Income-Group III 
Yemen AR - 1.13(-) - 1.00( +) - 1.02(-) - 0.87 
Sudan 0.03(+) - 0.05(+) - 0.31(+) - 0.43 
Somali - 0.73(=) -0.48(+) - 1.00(-) - 0.72 
Mauritania - 0.68(=) - 0.71(=) - 0.64(=) - 0.69 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to column four factor scores. 
words, given their relative populations, these coun-
tries performed considerably poorer than would• 
have been the case if size did not systematically 
affect the demand for industrial products. 
7. Several general patterns appear in 1975 when the 
Arab countries are looked at in terms of our three 
country groupings: 
a. With respect to Group 1 countries, lack of strong 
domestic linkages appears to have systematically 
constrained that group's industrial diversification 
efforts. This factor was neutral for Group III 
countries of industry with non-industrial sectors 
had proven to be a stimulus to industrial output. 
b. Relative size (as proxied by population) had tended 
to constrain industrial production in Group I coun-
tries, facilitate it in Group II countries and had been 
somewhat neutral in the case of Group III countries. 
c. The overall effects of size and domestic linkages 
appear, with the notable exception of Qatar, to have 
suppressed the industrial diversification efforts of 
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Table 9 
Arab States: Factors Affecting Industrial Production, 1985 
Standard Regression Coefficients 
Oblique Factor Pattern 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4 
EXTERNAL MANUFACTURE DISTRIBUT. SERVICES 
Services/GDP 0.97 0.15 - 0.02 -0.05 
Govt. expenditure/absorption 0.88 0.10 - 0.34 0.00 
Services/absorption 0.86 0.54 0.10 - 0.24 
Oil/absorption 0.83 -0,03 0.38 0.00 
Govt. expenditure/GDP 0.82 -0.24 -0.24 0.18 
Oil/GDP 0.77 -0.26 0.41 0.10 
Manufacturing/absorption 0.08 0.97 0.08 0.25 
LINKAGES -0.10 0.84 -0.05 - 0.27 
Manufacturing/GDP 0.15 0.78 0.15 0.51 
Distribution/GDP 0.01 - 0.04 0.96 -0.02 
Distribution/absorption - 0.12 0.48 0.74 - 0.17 
SIZE, GDP 0.13 - 0.01 -0.07 0.88 
SIZE, POPULATION - 0.43 0.38 - 0.12 0.67 
Factor Scores (manufacturing) 
Incorporating 
Size, Pep. Linkages Size, Pop. Neither 
Linkages 
011 Economle~Group I 
UAE 0.44(-) 0.79(=) 0.64(-) 0.84 
Bahrain 0.92(=) 0.87(=) 0.83(-) 0.91 
Saudi Arabia -0.92(-) - 0.46(=) - 0.54(-) - 0.44. 
Oman - 1.66(=) - 1.67(=) - 1.74(=) - 1.71 
Qatar 1.21(+) 0.94(=) 0.97(+) 0.83 
Kuwait -1.32(-) - 1.13(-) -0.79 -0.79 
Libya na na na na 
Middle Income-Group II 
Iraq .. na na na na 
Jordan -0.19(-) - 0.19(-) - 0.05(=) o.oi 
Egypt 0.62(=) 0.66(=) 0.83( +) 0.64 
Algeria 0.22(=) 0.44(+) 0.22(=) 0.27 
Tunisia 0.56(=) 0.52(=) 0.46(=) 0.49 
Morocco 1.56(-) 1.55(-) 1.74(=) 1.69 
Low Income-Group III 
PDR Yemen na na na na 
Yemen AR - 0.72(+) - 0.97(=) - 1.00(=) - 1.03 
Sudan 0.41(+) 0.10(+) - 0.17(=) -0.23 
Mauritania - 1.24(+) - 1.46(=) - 1.51(=) - 1.50 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to column four factor scores. 
the Group I countries. Group II countries had 
benefitted considerably from these effects, while 
Group III countries had, with the possible exception 
of Sudan, experienced no effects from these factors. 
By 1980 the picture (Table 8) had changed to the 
extent that: 
1. While still experiencing difficulties integrating their 
industrial structures with the domestic economy 
(second column, bottom Table 8), the Group I 
countries appeared, as a whole to have improved 
their record relative to 1975. 
2. However, the limitations imposed by market size, 
continued to limit Bahrain and the UAE's industrial I 
diversification efforts. I 
3. Overall the net effects of size and domestic linkages! 
continued (column one, bottom of Table 8) tol 
suppress industrialization in the Group I countries.j 
4. Despite high investment rates over the 1975-80 
period financed by oil revenues, several of the more1 
important Group I countries-Saudi Arabia, Bah·l 
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rain had significant declines (column 4 bottom of 
Table 8 v column 4 bottom of Table 7) in their 
relative standing on the scale of Arab world indus-
trial diversification. 
5. Only the UAE had any real success in increasing the 
share of manufacturing in non-oil dgp and absorp-
tion. 
6. Each of the Group II countries made considerable 
progress in overcoming the limitations imposed by 
size and domestic linkages, with Egypt, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco leading the way. In most 
cases, these gains were fairly evenly distributed 
between linkage and size factors. 
7. As might be anticipated, the Group III countries fell 
further behind in their relative degree of industriali-
zation. 
Finally, by 1985 (Table 9): 
l. With the exception of Qatar, most of the Group I 
countries were still experiencing constraints to in-
dustrialization brought on by their small size and 
relative lack of domestic linkages. The U AE made 
the greatest progress over the 197 5-85 period in 
overcoming these limitations, followed by Qatar. 
2. For the Group I countries, size (with the exception 
of Kuwait and perhaps Qatar) posed a greater hin-
drance to further industrial diversification than that 
posed by the relative lack of domestic linkages .to 
industry. 
3. The relative decline of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is 
clearly related to the overexpansion of the service 
and distribution sectors in these countries, rather 
than any marked lag in industrial output. Still, the 
fall in their relative ranking in terms of industriali-
zation in the Arab world is discouraging, as is 
Kuwait's decline between 1980 and 1985. 
4. All of the Group II countries with the exception of 
Egypt improved their ranking on the scale of indus-
trial diversification over the 1975-88 period, while 
the Group III countries continued to fall further 
behind. 
Observations on Gulf Industrialization 
Over time, the shocks set off by the 1973(74 oil price 
increases have created three somewhat unique envi-
ronments, each of which has tended to shape the 
industrial structures of its member countries in a pre-
dictable manner. 
The net result has been the almost complete differ-
entiation of the Arab world into three distinct types of 
economies, each of which can be characterized by an 
industrial structure unique to the members of that 
group. 
As identified here, the oil economies have over 
expanded their service and distribution sectors relative 
to industry. While the UAE and Qatar have been 
relatively bright spots, the small size of these countries 
and their lack of domestic integration have put severe 
limitations on further industrialization. This fact has 
been made even more apparent by the post-1982 fall in 
oil revenues, and the resulting inability of these gov-
ernments to provide a continued high level of subsidies 
to industry. 
All and all, the results of this process were the 
creation of an industrial sector with the following 
characteristics. 10 
1. The variation between the level of infrastructural 
development achieved and the incentives provided 
an any givens tate has created an imbalance whereby 
some states have become centres for industry at the 
expense of others. The states which have developed 
an industrial infrastructure more quickly have at-
tracted the skilled labour and the economic activity 
have attracted the skilled labour and the economic 
activity required, while other areas have been rela-
tively depopulated and starved of investment. This 
phenomenon on an inter-state basis is even more 
apparent on a regional basis within a given state. 
Unbalanced economic development prevents maxi-
mum exploitation of the region's natural resources. 
2. The industrial development process is heavily de-
pendent on transient migrant labour. In 1975 the 
percentage of foreign labour in the economically 
active population in Kuwait reached 80 per cent 
while the foreign element was even higher in Qatar 
and the UAE. The failure to produce an indigenous 
workforce can be attributed to several factors the 
most important of which are: 
a The arbitrary distribution of revenues from produc-
tion without any direct relationship between in-
come and productivity of the beneficiaries of the 
distribution. 
~. The limitations of educational curricula and the ina-
bility of the duration system to promote the concept 
and principle of productivity with the result that the 
young Gulf citizen seeks to create an identity through 
conspicuous consumption rather than through con-
spicuous consumption rather than through the crea-
tion or accumulation of wealth. 
c Social traditions and legal complications which ob-
10 See Abdulla Hamad Al-Moajil (1986) pp. 17-18). 
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struct participation of women economic activities, 
thus further reducing the limited availability of 
manpower. 
d The cost trap into which Gulf industries fell in the 
first states of development and from which they can 
only escape through carefully planned controls and 
policies. 
The cost trap is a result of bad management, lack of 
supervision to prevent waste, and most important of 
all, a direct consequence of corruption at manage-
ment level. 
Conclusions 
The results obtained above are suggestive of the need 
.. 
for a joint industrial strategy in the Gulf. While the 
articulation of such a strategy is beyond the scope of 
the present study, is clear that any endeavour along 
these lines must begin with increased efforts at eco-
nomic integration through the Gulf cooperation coun-
cil. Such a strategy has become vitally necessary if 
these countries want to make the transition from con-
sumer-oriented societies, dependent for the mainte-
nance for their high standard of living on the constant 
exchange of depleting oil reserves for consumer goods, 
to production based societies less dependent on exter-
nal factor:; and less constrained by internal limitation 
for the maintenance of their standards of living (Ab-
dulla Hamad Al-Moajil (1986) p.23). 
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